DOCUMENT A/1801

4 December 2002

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Parliamentary oversight of the intelligence services in the WEU countries - current situation and prospects for reform

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Document A/1801

4 December 2002

Parliamentary oversight of the intelligence services in the
WEU countries - current situation and prospects for reform

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations²
by Mrs Kestelijn-Sierens, Rapporteur

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 12 November 2002.

² Members of the Committee: Mr Debarge (Chairman); Mrs Castro Masaveu, Lord Russell-Johnston (Vice-Chairmen); Mrs Agudo Cadarso, MM Banks (Alternate: Vis), Bartsch, Baroness Billingham, MM Budin, Çörüz, Duivesteijn, Mrs Fernández Capel Baños, Mr Graas, Ms Hoffmann, Ms Jäger, Ms Katseli, Ms Kestelijn-Sierens, MM Legendre, Loncle, Martins, Masson, Naro, Occhetto (Alternate: Crema), Pavlidis, Selva, Mrs Smith, Mrs Süssmuth, MM Van den Brande, Vieira (Alternate: Anacoreta Correia).

Associate members: Mrs Akgönenç, MM Bergvinsson, Gawlowski, Ms Gülek, MM Kaminski, Kelemen, Mrs Kosa Kovacs, MM Lorenz, Matuska, Mrs Novakova, MM Reikvam, Yürür, N...

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

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RESOLUTION 113¹

The Assembly,

(i) Considering the international commitments subscribed to in the Code of Conduct on the politico-military aspects of security at the OSCE Budapest Summit in 1994 and drawing inspiration from the principles set out in Recommendation 1402/1999 of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly which called for the law to set limits on investigations in order to preserve human rights;

(ii) Recalling Assembly Recommendation 707 adopted in June 2002, calling in the long term for the definition of a proper European intelligence policy for which the member states must define harmonised national policies and create more similar national intelligence structures;

(iii) Aware that this process has already started at parliamentary level in numerous European countries which apply the common principles that will lay the groundwork for more effective parliamentary scrutiny in coordination with partner countries,

1. Support plans for reforming intelligence systems, while defending parliamentary prerogatives with a view to more efficient and effective democratic scrutiny of intelligence gathering activities and of the use to which that information is put;
2. Endeavour to organise cooperation with the parliamentary bodies responsible for the oversight of the intelligence services in partner countries, by holding joint meetings on cases likely to be of interest to intelligence services beyond the national borders;
3. Use all the human and economic resources available to the committees in charge of scrutinising the activities of the intelligence services with a view to making the tools available to them more effective.

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1. This report is a follow-up to the analysis presented by the WEU Assembly report on "the new challenges facing European intelligence" submitted by our colleague, Mr Lemoine² on 4 June 2002.
2. The grave threat posed by international terrorism and the danger of a recrudescence of internal terrorism make it essential to achieve the broadest possible cooperation among the different countries. Moreover it is vital that each state should be able to rely on the combined efforts of all political and civil forces, first and foremost those of the public institutions, to support the government while at the same time providing effective parliamentary scrutiny of its actions.
3. The intelligence services are an instrument in the hands of public institutions and can be used for better or for worse: they may provide a means of detecting and averting potentially dangerous situations, but they can also be misused as a means of secretly bringing pressure to bear. Clearly therefore, in a modern democratic society, there is a need for a system of checks and balances to ensure compliance with the laws governing the activities of the intelligence and security services. Hence, while it is the task of the executive power to supervise their management and that of the judicial power to sanction any cases of non-compliance with the law, it is up to the legislative power to provide the legislative framework for the activities of those services and to scrutinise their compliance with the law.
4. This problem was already brought to the attention of the European countries at the OSCE Summit in Budapest in 1994, at a time when the new eastern European republics were in the process of establishing their democratic institutions. It remains to be seen what follow-up there has been to the international commitments that were entered into on that occasion, when the states that signed up to the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security recognised "the democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces as well as of intelligence services and the police to be an indispensable element of stability and security". And what basic individual rights do parliaments wish, as a priority, to defend against all forms of investigation, in the light of the recommendation by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (1402/1999) stating that that the law should regulate "which kinds of operational activities carrying a high risk of violation of individual rights may be used in which circumstances (...)".
5. This report will study the means and objectives of such parliamentary scrutiny and take stock of the solutions that currently exist in the WEU countries, in order to draw comparisons and, if necessary, to come up with ideas for reforms that will enable our institutions to function more effectively.

6. Governments of course bear the responsibility for managing information on national security and for ensuring the proper functioning of the public bodies whose task it is to protect national security, but in this as in any other policy area they are accountable to parliaments.
7. In the different countries there are various bodies whose task is to gather intelligence for preventive purposes in order to protect national security. Those countries that have opted for a diversified structure to prevent the emergence of an occult power draw a distinction between the civil and military areas, which each have their intelligence services that are answerable, respectively, to the Ministries of the Interior and Defence, and partly also in some cases to the Ministry of Justice. Other countries do not find such a distinction useful or functional, and their intelligence services are placed under the direct authority of the Prime Minister, who shares the responsibility, as far as official secrets are concerned, with the head of state.
8. In both systems it is essential when collecting and managing confidential information to avoid the excesses that have characterised most totalitarian systems in the past. Moreover it is important that citizens should have the assurance that such information is put to proper use. Parliaments have therefore adopted legislation on original systems for providing such scrutiny and guarantees.
9. The first purpose of the role played by the parliaments in this area is to check compliance by the intelligence services with the legislative framework that they themselves set when they adopted the laws instituting those services, and whose prime objective is to ensure that a balance is struck - between security and individual freedom and between the collective interests of society and the rights of individual citizen - that takes account of the real situation and history of the country concerned.
10. The specific circumstances of each country also determine the type of scrutiny exercised by parliament: in opposition to or in cooperation with the intelligence services, or both at once. Finally, parliaments act as an intermediary between the intelligence services and public opinion, and have an educational role to play vis-à-vis the latter about the purpose and necessity of intelligence activities, once the aims of such activities have been democratically approved.
11. However, the information that is required for national security purposes is highly specific and cannot by definition be divulged in advance or subjected in most cases to public debate. Neither can the intelligence services be controlled too meticulously, down to the last detail, which could hamper their operational efficiency. At the same time, they are working in democratic states where individual freedom and dignity must prevail and where no abuse of power will be tolerated by public opinion. Under such circumstances it is difficult to reconcile the requirements of secrecy on the one hand, and the need for parliamentary scrutiny and compliance with citizens' rights, on the other.
12. Parliamentary chambers have various powers of information and scrutiny allowing them to supervise the activities of their governments in this field. These powers are set down in their rules of procedure and may take the form, inter alia, of questions, resolutions, inquiries or study missions. Such classical methods of scrutiny are to be found in practically all modern parliaments.
13. Most assemblies, not satisfied with conventional means of parliamentary scrutiny in this area, have preferred to set up a single ad hoc body in charge of these activities, which are inclined to be dispersed, while endeavouring to strike a balance between the essential need for secrecy and confidentiality of intelligence activities and the transparency needed to exercise parliamentary scrutiny in keeping with our democratic principles. These bodies, in the form of small specialised committees with clearly defined powers and bound by strict rules, are present these days in practically all our countries. Many are undergoing a process of transformation and where they do not yet exist, a debate is under way and proposals are being examined.
14. Before looking at the experience of individual countries, it is also useful to study the different types of practical action by parliament vis-à-vis the intelligence services. Three levels of action may be identified: simple oversight, scrutiny and voting. Oversight is exercised on the basis of the regular reports that the intelligence services are bound to submit to parliament through the responsible Minister and which provide the opportunity for a general debate on the purpose of the work that has been done. The right of scrutiny allows parliaments to request access to certain documents and to call for the officials concerned to account for their actions. Finally, in any parliamentary democracy parliaments have the possibility of voting with regard to the planned activities of the intelligence services, from the vote on the budget for such activities through to a vote of confidence vis-à-vis the competent minister or indeed the government as a whole.
15. As regards the choice of the most appropriate parliamentary body to exercise those functions, taking into account the complexity and sensitivity of these matters, a distinction can be drawn between the scrutiny exercised directly by a parliamentary committee assisted by experts, and that exercised by some intermediary body which may be a technical committee or an ombudsman appointed by the Parliament. The choice will depend on the degree to which the legislative power deems it necessary to set this function apart from politics, in order to maintain its neutrality and offer a guarantee to citizens.

1. The situation in the WEU member states

16. We will therefore examine the arrangements in place in the member countries that have set up specialised bodies within their parliaments for the purpose of scrutinising all the intelligence services. Those countries do not include France, Luxembourg and Portugal, which exercise that supervision through the conventional means of parliamentary scrutiny vis-à-vis their governments.

17. The Federal Republic of Germany has an essentially liberal constitution which guarantees fundamental freedoms and lays down a strict framework for political power. The Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) doubtless provides the best possible synthesis of those two principles. Its task is to watch over the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens and it is prevented by a stringent system of checks and balances from exceeding its powers. The Federal Office is the main body responsible for the intelligence services at federal level. Its status and functions are governed by a set of regulations, decrees and guidelines. Within each Land is a comparable structure (Verfassungsschutzbehörde) with regional competence and subject to local regulations.
18. There are four mechanisms for the oversight of the intelligence services: parliamentary scrutiny, administrative controls, legal controls via the legal recourse that individuals may have against measures taken by the intelligence services and scrutiny by public opinion. The obligation for the Federal Office to cooperate with the competent authorities in each Land provides additional guarantees. Indeed, the control mechanisms function at both federal and regional level.
19. There are three types of administrative oversight which provide a strict framework for the activities of the Federal Office and which can be described as a form of parliamentary scrutiny, in that all public authorities are accountable to the elected representatives of the nation. They are as follows:

20. Parliamentary scrutiny is exercised through debates in the Bundestag, oral or written questions to the Government, and more specifically the Interior Minister, who is accountable to Parliament, and the reports submitted by the Committee in charge of home affairs, the budget and petitions, or even by specific committees of inquiry handling a particular issue.
21. Specific parliamentary scrutiny in this area was reorganised following reforms of the system in 1992 and 1999. There is now a single body with broader powers of scrutiny, the Parlamentarisches Kontrollgremium (PKGr, Parliamentary Control Commission) composed of nine members elected by the Bundestag and whose political composition reflects that of the Bundestag. It meets at least once per quarter and is bound to secrecy. In principle, the PKGr's powers of scrutiny are unlimited. It is authorised by the Government, under certain conditions, to study case-files and expert opinions, to interview members of staff from the intelligence services and to visit the relevant services.
22. This parliamentary body is flanked by the so-called G-10 Commission, whose title refers to Article 10 of the Basic Law, Germany's supreme legal instrument, in which the principle of the privacy of letters, posts, and telecommunications is entrenched. However, the law on that Article makes provision for certain limitations to it. It is the job of the G-10 Commission to supervise the implementation of those limitations to prevent any abuses. In cases of telephone tapping, for example, the four members of the G-10 Commission, who are also members of the PKGr receive a monthly report from the Interior Ministry to check that the limitations applied under Article 10 of the Basic Law are justified and proportional to requirements.
23. The law on combating terrorism, which came into force in January 2002, makes provision for certain minor changes to the parliamentary scrutiny of the intelligence services. In particular, the G10 Commission must submit an additional report to the Bundestag. The overall system, however, remains unchanged.

24. Belgium has the particularity of providing a first level of indirect parliamentary scrutiny of the intelligence services. That indirect scrutiny is governed by the institutional act of 18 July 1991 (MB - official journal - of 26 July 1991), which was amended on certain points by the law of 1 April 1999 (MB of 7 May 1999). The 18 July 1991 institutional act set up two standing committees - Committee R for the scrutiny of the intelligence and security services and Committee P for the scrutiny of the police services - composed not of parliamentarians, but of experts or legal specialists appointed in the first case by the Senate, in the second case by the Chamber of Representatives. Those Committees are organs of Parliament that provide a source of external scrutiny by Parliament. They in turn are subject to parliamentary oversight by two supervisory bodies: one from the Senate with responsibility essentially for supervising Standing Committee R, and the second from the Chamber of Representatives in charge of supervising Standing Committee P. Those two bodies are composed, respectively, of four Senators and nine Deputies, and are chaired by their respective Speakers.
25. Standing Committees R and P were established by the 1991 institutional act to exercise external scrutiny over the intelligence and security services on the one hand, and over the police services on the other hand. Their task is to monitor the relevant services to check that they are functioning properly and to draft reports on their findings. In particular their job is to protect the constitutional and legal rights of individuals and to monitor the coordination and efficiency of the police, intelligence and security services (Article 1 of the institutional act).
26. Standing Committee R scrutinises:

27. Standing Committee P scrutinises:

28. The members of Standing Committee R are appointed by the Senate, those of Standing Committee P by the Chamber of Representatives, for a renewable five-year mandate. Standing Committee R has only three members, while Standing Committee P has five members.
29. The Standing Committees may draft recommendations as an aid to political decision-making. They are also entitled to call on the relevant authorities to adapt the way in which the police and services function on one point or another or to amend the legislation governing those services.
30. As organs of Parliament, they have no hierarchical link whatsoever with the services under their scrutiny. They make their findings available to Parliament, to the relevant minister or to the competent authorities, who may or may not decide to take action. Parliament may use the results of inquiries as a basis for legislative initiatives or for exercising its constitutional right of scrutiny over the executive power.
31. Each Standing Committee is assisted in its tasks by an investigation service that is responsible, under its authority, for conducting investigations in the field. The head of that service is appointed by the Committee for a specific duration. Members of that service have the status of an officer of the police judiciaire. This gives them the necessary authority to conduct investigations concerning members of the police and intelligence services.
32. Under the Law of 1 April 1999, the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives must each set up a supervisory body to monitor, respectively, the activities of Standing Committees R and P. Each of those bodies "supervises" the work of the relevant Standing Committee to ensure compliance with the provisions of the institutional act and with the Standing Committee's internal rules (Article 66b, section 2).
33. One of the powers of those supervisory bodies under the 1999 Law is to examine the Standing Committees' reports before their publication. Articles 11 (Standing Committee P) and 35 (Standing Committee R) of the 1991 institutional act stipulate that the two Standing Committees must submit their annual reports to the two Chambers and to the relevant Ministers by 15 April at the latest. The supervisory bodies must review the reports before that date.
34. Following the abovementioned reform, the Senate and Chamber of Representatives must each make provision in their respective rules of procedure for the composition and modus operandi of the relevant Standing Committee. However, Article 66b.4 of the 1 April 1999 act also sets out a number of binding provisions regarding the latter, which include the following:

35. The former symmetry between the membership of the two Standing Committees has been abandoned. From now on, it is up to the Senate to appoint the members of Committee R and to the Chamber of Representatives to appoint the members of Committee P (whereas previously the Senate and Chamber took turns to appoint the members). The supervisory body for Standing Committee R is currently composed of five members, whereas that for Standing Committee P has ten members.
36. In application of Art 66b, the two supervisory bodies hold a number of joint meetings. Under new Article 86b of the Senate rules of procedure, the supervisory bodies must draw up rules of procedure for their joint sessions.
37. The confidentiality of information is assured first and foremost by Article 86b of the Senate rules of procedure which sets out a series of measures to guarantee confidentiality (for example, the members, who meet in camera, are not entitled to have themselves replaced). Although the Chamber of Representatives has no specific rule on the confidentiality of information, it would in any case appear desirable to maintain the principle of excluding non-members, at least when discussing the results of an inquiry.

38. In Spain, scrutiny of the intelligence services and official secrets are the sole responsibility of the Congress of Deputies; the Senate is not involved at all. Previously, the Defence Committee, and to a lesser extent the Justice and Home Affairs Committee, were competent for scrutinising the activities and initiatives of the body with specific responsibility for the intelligence services (CESID: Centro superior de información de la defensa) which came under the authority of the Defence Ministry. However, their powers were limited to dealing with information not classified by the Government as "confidential" or "restricted".
39. Furthermore, under the law of 11 May 1995 on the use and supervision of allocations for special expenditures, all those allocations, which are automatically placed in the category of "official secrets", are subject to parliamentary oversight through a parliamentary Committee. That Committee is chaired by the Speaker of the Congress of Deputies and composed in addition of members of parliament with access to official secrets, their access being governed by a set of parliamentary rules which are set out in an earlier resolution adopted on 2 June 1992: access to classified documents is granted to one representative per political group, all of whom must be elected in plenary by a three-fifths majority.
40. All this has just been revised by Law no. 11 of 6 May 2002 establishing the National Intelligence Centre under the authority of the Defence Ministry to replace the CESID. Under the heading "parliamentary scrutiny" in Article 11 of that law, it is stipulated that the new Centre is required to submit the relevant information on its modus operandi and activities to the Congress of Deputies via the abovementioned Committee on the use and supervision of allocations for special expenditures, whose meetings and deliberations, by virtue of the same Article, are held in camera.

41. Under Law 2225 of 1994, a National Committee for the protection of the secrecy of communications was set up under the chairmanship of a Vice-President of the Greek Parliament designated by the President of the Parliament. It is composed of a member of parliament from each political group, plus a communications expert also designated by the President of the Parliament. The Committee is responsible for:

42. One of its most important tasks is to carry out unannounced inspections of the installations, archives and documents of the intelligence services and to seek out any information required to perform its functions.
43. If the information supplied is deemed to be insufficient, the Committee may examine classified archives and documents. To date it has not exercised its right of scrutiny.

44. The law of 24 October 1977 not only reorganised the whole system governing information policy and the intelligence and security services, but also set up a Parliamentary Committee responsible for the intelligence and security services and official secrets. It is composed of four members from each Chamber appointed by their respective Presidents at the start of each legislature, in a way which reflects the political spectrum in parliament. The Committee elects its Chairman, who is taken from each Chamber in turn, and applies the Rules of the relevant Chamber. Traditionally the Chairman is a member of an opposition party. The members of the Committee are bound to secrecy regarding information received and opinions expressed during the course of their activities.
45. Under the law, the Committee is responsible for checking that the intelligence and security services carry out their activities in compliance with the principles defined by the law. For that purpose, the Committee may ask the Government to supply information on essential aspects of the structures and activities of those services. It should be pointed out that under the current government, there is a specific minister in charge of the civil service and coordination of the intelligence and security services who provides the contact person for Parliament on those issues. The Committee does not have the power to demand the relevant documents or to carry out direct inspections, and the only regular source of information comes from the half-yearly reports submitted by the Government to parliament. The Committee may express criticism and make proposals, which may be set out in a report to parliament. The two Chambers may then, on the basis of such a report, debate and vote on a resolution addressed to the Government.
46. The Prime Minister may refuse the Committee's request for information on the grounds of official secrets, stating his reasons for doing so. If an absolute majority of Committee members deem that those reasons are not valid, it may draft a report for parliament in order to obtain a political assessment. Under Article 202 of the Penal Code, state employees may refuse to testify before penal courts on facts falling under the official secrets act. If the Prime Minister confirms such a refusal, he must inform the Committee of that decision. If the Committee does not find his reasons valid, it must inform parliament.
47. The Committee has no budgetary powers under the law. Allocations for intelligence activities are shared among the interior and defence ministries and the Prime Minister's office. Some of them fall in the category of restricted information and cannot be the object of any official report.
48. Several reform bills are currently under review by the Senate (draft law 1513 and private bills 233 and 550) with a view to modernising the structure and organisation of the services (the current system dates back to 1977) and improving international cooperation. Under the new legislation, the powers of the parliamentary Committee would be strengthened, allowing it to call on the Government to provide it with documents and information on the basis of which it could formulate comments and proposals, within an overall system of enhanced confidentiality. The problem of the possible limits to be set for the parliamentary scrutiny at national level of operations conducted abroad has been raised, paving the way for a broader debate at European level.

49. One of the most important pillars of Dutch parliamentary democracy is laid down in Article 68 of the Constitution: "Ministers and State Secretaries shall provide the Chambers orally or in writing with any information requested by one or more members, provided that the provision of such information does not conflict with the interests of the State". This duty to provide information is both active and passive. Not only must information that is asked for be provided, ministers must also take the initiative to provide Parliament with information where this is desirable for good and democratic government. A failure to fulfil this duty will "show", and when this occurs, a minister may lose the trust of the Chamber. One of the rules governing all aspects of Dutch politics is that trust is presumed unless distrust is shown to be justified. The minister may be dispensed from giving information to the Chamber on grounds of national interest.
50. As regards the formal arrangements for parliamentary scrutiny, since 1952 the Second Chamber has had a Standing Committee to monitor intelligence and security agencies. The Chamber decides on the creation of committees. Since 1994, the Standing Committee on security agencies has had its own place in Article 22 of the Rules of Procedures of the Chamber, which stipulates that, "There shall be an intelligence and security services committee". Article 25 stipulates that, "The Speaker shall determine how many members a committee is to have (...) in so far as he considers desirable, he may appoint deputy members". According to Article 37, "The meetings of committees shall be public, the House may decide that meetings of a particular committee may be held in private".
51. From 1952 onwards the Standing Committee was composed of the chairmen of the main political groups in the House and the number of members varied. Since 1977, however, the Committee has consisted of the chairmen of the four largest groups only. It is an unwritten rule that the chairman of the largest political group in the House is appointed chairman of the Committee. Following the 1998 elections, the four members of the Committee, including the leader of the opposition, represented 126 seats of the total of 150. Following the latest elections (leading to the addition of two more political groups) there is some discussion about whether the membership should stay at four or be increased, but the matter has not yet been settled.
52. The meetings of the Committee always take place behind closed doors. Not even the fact that the Committee is to meet is made public. It always meets in the presence of a minister, in most cases the Minister of the Interior, who is politically responsible for the National Security Agency (BVD), but at least twice a year its meetings are attended by the Minister of Defence, who is responsible for the Military Intelligence Service (MID). The Committee meets on its own initiative or at the Minister's request. Preparatory documents are made available to the Committee members only. The Committee submits an annual report to the Chamber as a whole, in which it mentions the subjects dealt with but carefully avoids giving any confidential information. The National Security Service submits its own annual report to the Chamber, through the Minister of the Interior. On the basis of those two reports, the Committee for the Interior holds a public debate with the Standing Committee and the Minister.
53. Both the Government and the Committee follow the rule that anything that can be made public is discussed publicly. The Government provides all the necessary information to guide discussions at Committee meetings. Clearly, this form of openness only works if there is a great deal of mutual trust. The Committee trusts the Minister to be as inclusive as possible, while the Minister trusts the MPs to respect the confidentiality of information. So far this arrangement has worked satisfactorily for both parties.
54. The Committee plays a vital role in preventing the Government from withholding information from the Chamber as a whole on the grounds of national security, and indeed such withholding of information would seem to be a very rare occurrence. At the same time the Committee makes sure that only relevant information is requested. Names of informers or names of sister-agencies are never asked for: protection of sources is all-important. The most important element of the Committee's scrutinising function is to closely monitor the security services to ensure that they work within the legal framework.
55. The Committee enjoys all parliamentary powers, including that of parliamentary inquiry. Witnesses have to appear before inquiry committees and all documents have to be handed over. Up until now there has been no specific inquiry into the secret services, but some years ago a parliamentary inquiry committee did launch investigations into the methods of tracing used by the police which touched upon the BVD (National Security Service). The Committee was able to come to an agreement with the Minister of the Interior on access to BVD files. Special security arrangements were drawn up to protect the premises and ensure the secrecy of the proceedings and documents.
56. The Standing Committee on the security services can - under its own responsibility - contract outsiders to perform certain duties. For example, the supervision of the removal and destruction of BVD files was entrusted to a "troika" of leading political and scientific experts who reported back to the Committee. Their report was subsequently passed on by the Committee to the Chamber and made public.
57. In May 2002 new legislation on the intelligence services was drafted in which provision is made for a Committee on Scrutiny responsible for advising the Defence and Interior Ministers and handling complaints about the activities of the security services. For the moment it is not clear what its relationship with the Parliamentary Committee will be.

58. The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) set up by the 1994 Intelligence Services Act and composed of parliamentarians, is in charge of scrutinising the three main civilian intelligence services.
59. The Security Service or MI5, whose tasks are defined by the 1989 Act, falls under the authority of the Home Affairs Office. It is responsible for internal security (the fight against terrorism and subversion and counterespionage).
60. The Secret Intelligence Service or MI6 falls under the authority of the Foreign Office. Under the 1994 Act it has responsibility for intelligence beyond the national borders.
61. The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is also under the authority of the Foreign Office. Under the 1994 Act it has responsibility for electronic intelligence.
62. However, the 1994 Act does not cover the Defence Intelligence Staff - in other words, the military intelligence service - which is answerable to the Ministry of Defence, or the National Criminal Intelligence Service, which is the police intelligence department. Those two bodies are subjected to scrutiny, respectively, by the parliamentary committees in charge of defence and home affairs.
63. Under the 1994 Act, the ISC is composed of nine members of parliament from either of the two Houses but who must not be ministers. They are appointed by the Prime Minister, after consultation with the leader of the opposition. Their term of office commences at the start of each legislature and in principle finishes at the end of that legislature. The ISC Chairman is appointed using the same procedure.
64. The ISC Chairman was for a long time the former conservative Defence Minister Tom King. Since July 2001 it has been Ann Taylor, a member of the Blair government until the government reshuffle that followed the last general election. Five of the remaining eight members are Labour members, two are Conservatives and one is from the Liberal Party.
65. Under the Act, the ISC draws up its own rules. However, the Act does specify that there is a quorum of three members and that in the event of a tie, the Chairman has the casting vote.
66. The ISC has the task, under the Act, of examining the expenditure, management and policy of MI5, MI6 and the GCHQ. Scrutiny of operational matters is, however, the responsibility of the executive. The heads of the three services are bound by the law to supply the ISC with the information it requests. However, there are restrictions on the information that the Parliamentary Committee is entitled to ask for, in that the heads of those services may refuse to supply, on the one hand, "sensitive" information, and on the other hand, information that the Minister does not deem it appropriate to divulge. Sensitive information, according to the Act, is that which concerns sources, working methods and operations, whether these be past, ongoing or planned, or information from a foreign country whose government is opposed to divulging that information. This notion is not linked with the classification of documents. However, in cases where the heads of the services deem that certain sensitive information may be divulged without danger, it may be revealed to the members of the ISC. In the event of disagreement, the competent Minister makes the final decision.
67. The ISC drafts an annual report which it submits to the Prime Minister who may censor it before passing it on to the two Houses of Parliament. In practice this means that the annual report contains a number of blanks.
68. Most British parliamentarians deplore the limited nature of the tasks given to the ISC and the fact that this Committee is not entirely independent of the Government.

2. The situation in the WEU associate member countries

69. A law on the freedom and protection of information adopted in 1992 defines the structure of the intelligence services. It gives parliament the task of appointing an ombudsman as a guardian of citizens' basic rights. That ombudsman may himself initiate action with regard to the activities of the intelligence services, or he may do so at the request of the interested parties. He may order the cessation of a specific activity and report any infringements of the law to the judicial authorities. He submits regular reports to parliament and may also draft recommendations.
70. The Hungarian Parliament, however, has no ad hoc body to supervise the activities of the intelligence services. That task is carried out by either the human rights or home affairs committee.

71. The Parliamentary Committee for Monitoring of Intelligence, Surveillance and Security Services is a permanent supervisory body for what are commonly referred to as "the secret services". It is responsible for the continuous supervision of the Norwegian Police Security Service, the Norwegian Defence Security Staff and the Norwegian Intelligence Service, collectively referred to as the "EOS services"(EOS being the Norwegian acronym for "Intelligence, Surveillance and Security").
72. The supervisory arrangement, established in 1996, is independent of the EOS services and the remainder of the public administration. The members of the Committee are appointed by the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament), which has passed a separate Act and Instructions for the Committee. The Committee keeps Parliament informed by means of annual reports and special reports. It carries out continuous supervision by means of regular inspections of the EOS services, both at their central headquarters and at individual units. The Committee also deals with complaints from private individuals and organisations believing themselves to be the victims of injustices committed by the EOS services.
73. The Committee for Monitoring of Intelligence, Surveillance and Security Services has seven members, including the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. Particular importance is attached to its broad composition, which must reflect both political experience and the experience of other sectors of society. The members are elected by the Storting in plenary session on the recommendation of the Storting Presidium. The term of office is normally five years. Committee members may be re-elected. The Committee conducts its day-to-day work independently of the Storting and members of parliament may not be elected to the Committee.
74. All Committee members and the staff of its secretariat have the highest security clearance in accordance with national and NATO rules.
75. The task of the Committee is to supervise the intelligence, surveillance and security services performed or managed by the public authorities for the purpose of safeguarding national security interests. Intelligence, surveillance and security services for other purposes, ordinary criminal intelligence and traffic surveillance are not included in its remit.
76. Its supervisory activities are not linked with specific organisational entities. It is therefore not of decisive importance for the Committee as the supervisory authority which bodies or agencies perform EOS services at any given time. Currently these duties are assigned to the Norwegian Police Security Service, the Norwegian Defence Security Staff and the Norwegian Intelligence Service. Consequently, those are the services that are currently subjected to ongoing supervision by the Committee. However, the Committee may also conduct investigations concerning other parts of the public service if this is deemed necessary to clarify the facts of a case. The purpose of its supervision is primarily to safeguard the legal rights of individuals. It is the Committee's job to establish whether anyone is being subjected to unjust treatment and to prevent this from occurring, and also to ensure that the EOS services do not make use of more intrusive methods than are necessary in the circumstances. The Committee is also required to carry out general monitoring to ensure that the EOS services keep their activities within the legislative framework.
77. The Committee's monitoring responsibilities do not embrace activities involving persons who are not resident in Norway or organisations that have no address in the country. The same applies to activities involving foreign citizens, whose residence in Norway is associated with service for a foreign state. This exception is intended particularly for diplomatic personnel. However, the Committee may monitor these areas too, if there are special grounds for doing so. Public Prosecutors and the Director General of Public Prosecutions are also exempt from monitoring by the Committee.
78. The Committee can express its views on matters or circumstances that it investigates in the course of its supervisory activities and make recommendations to the EOS services, proposing, for example, that a matter be reconsidered or that a particular measure or practice be discontinued. However, it has no authority to issue instructions or to make decisions concerning the services.
79. In its reports to the Storting, the Committee may draw attention to circumstances or issues in the EOS services that it regards as being of current interest. This provides the Storting with a basis for considering whether, for example, there is a need for practical or legislative changes.
80. The Committee has broad rights to inspect government archives and registers and an equivalent right of access to government premises and installations of all kinds. This is necessary for the Committee to perform its supervisory tasks. The Committee may summon employees of the EOS services and other government employees and private persons to give oral evidence to the Committee. It may also call for evidence to be taken in court. Moreover, it is entitled to call on expert assistance for its supervisory activities where this is deemed appropriate. It sometimes does so in the field of data and telecommunications, particularly for the purpose of supervising the Norwegian Intelligence Service.
81. The Committee exercises supervision in two ways: by means of regular inspections and by investigations into specific matters. The latter may be in response to a complaint, but even if no complaint has been submitted, the Committee may on its own initiative investigate matters that it finds reason to examine more closely. Quite a large number of investigations fall into this category. Particular importance is attached to investigating matters or circumstances that have been the subject of public criticism.
82. Much of the information the Committee receives in its supervisory capacity and in investigating complaints is classified, i.e. subject to secrecy on grounds of national security interests. Classified information cannot be disclosed by the Committee. This sets clear limits to the kind of information the Committee may provide to complainants about the course and results of its investigations.
83. The Committee's reports to the Storting are unclassified. If it considers that the Storting should be acquainted with classified information regarding a specific matter, it must bring this to the attention of the Storting. It is then up to the Storting to decide whether or not it wishes to procure the information.

84. The structure of the relevant services in Poland underwent a reform with the adoption of the Internal Security Agency and Intelligence Agency Act on 24 May 2002. With the establishment of those two agencies, the Office of State Protection completed its duties. Both agencies are government bodies. The heads of the agencies, as well as that of the military intelligence services, are supervised by the Special Services Committee.
85. Tasks of the Special Services Committee:

86. The Special Services Committee is composed of no more than 9 members of parliament. The Sejm, on the basis of a motion from its Presidium, adopts a resolution specifying the number of members. Candidates for membership of the Committee are nominated by the chairmen of the political groups or by a group of at least 35 deputies. Nominations are submitted to the President of the Sejm.
87. The Sejm determines the membership of the Committee by a joint vote on the basis of a motion tabled by its the Presidium in consultation with the Council of Seniors. The first sitting of the Committee on the Special Services is convened and chaired by the President of the Sejm. At that meeting, the Committee elects from amongst its members a Presidium composed of a Chairman and Vice-Chairman. Committee resolutions are adopted by an absolute majority, requiring the presence of at least half of the total number of Committee members. The Committee defines its own operating and decision-making procedures.
88. Conditions for access by members of the Committee to classified information of the utmost importance for national defence, the armed forces and state security are set out in the provisions concerning official secrets. To obtain authorisation for access by the Committee members to such information, the President of the Sejm must apply to the Minister of Defence or the Minister of the Interior and Administration.
89. Meetings of the Special Services Committee are held in camera. Joint meetings with other committees may be open to the public. For matters relating to the Special Services, the Committee participates in the deliberations on draft budgets and other financial plans of the state and on the reports on their implementation, and submits its opinion to the relevant committees.
90. The minutes of meetings of the Special Services Committee and its reports are regarded as official secrets, but not those emanating from joint meetings with other committees which are open to the public. The Committee submits its minutes and reports to the President of the Sejm only, but it may issue press communiqués concerning its proceedings, subject to prior consultation with the Minister of Defence or the Minister of the Interior and Administration, as appropriate, with regard to their content.

91. Under Act 153/1994 on the Intelligence services in the Czech republic, three specialised committees are set up by the Chamber of Deputies at the start of each legislature:

92. Each Committee is composed of seven members of parliament (its members must be approved by the Chamber of Deputies, which also appoints the Chairman). The composition of all Committees must reflect the principle of proportional representation (with three members taken from the opposition parties).
93. These Committees meet in camera and the minutes of those meetings and the resolutions adopted are not published or accessible to the public.
94. The main task of the Committee for oversight of the Security Information Service is to supervise the administrative and technical aspects of the operations of this (civilian) intelligence service i.e. its rules of procedure, classified case-files, use of budgetary resources, keeping of data on file, working methods etc. It also deals with enquiries from members of the public or institutions with regard to the Security Information Service's activities.
95. The Committee carries out inspections in the regional departments of the Security Information Service in order to obtain complete information, in particular as regards the way in which those departments organise their work and the technical means at their disposal.
96. The Committees for the oversight of the military intelligence and police services are bound by a set of guidelines governing their activities.
97. Under the internal rules of the Chamber of Deputies, each Committee must submit a report on its activities at least once a year.

98. Law 2937 on the organisation of the Turkish intelligence services refers in article 20 to the role of parliament in approving the budget allocations for the MIT (national security service), the discussions on which are held in camera. There is no specific supervisory body.

3. The situation in the WEU associate partner countries

99. The Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu) Select Committee on the Supervision of the Security Authorities is composed of six members from the various political groups in the Riigikogu. There are no alternates.
100. The Committee was established pursuant to the Riigikogu Rules of Procedure Act and the Security Authorities Act (of 22 December 2000), in order to supervise the activities of the security and surveillance services.
101. In the performance of its duties, the Committee exercises the authority vested in it by the Security Authorities Act:

102. The Latvian parliament, the Saeima, has a National Security Committee composed of 10 members of parliament, which is responsible for scrutinising the intelligence services. The 10 members of parliament, plus one Committee adviser, have special security clearance giving them access to classified documents for that purpose.

103. To introduce more precision into the regulation of parliamentary scrutiny of the intelligence services as defined in the Intelligence law, the Lithuanian Parliament (Seimas) passed an amendment to that law on 2 July 2002 stipulating that parliamentary scrutiny of the activities of the intelligence services of the State Security Department and Second department of Operational Services under the Ministry of National Defence shall be exercised by, respectively, the Security and Defence Sub-Committees of the Seimas Committee on National Security and Defence, whose members are authorised to have access to and work with classified information marked as "top secret".
104. The role of intelligence is also addressed in the National Security Strategy approved by the Seimas on 28 May 2002. This Strategy states as its objective to strengthen anti-terrorist intelligence and counterintelligence.

105. A Standing Committee for the parliamentary scrutiny of the Romanian intelligence service was set up by the Chamber of Deputies and Senate pursuant to a decree adopted at a joint sitting on 23 June 1993, in compliance with Article 74 of the Constitution. It is composed of nine members elected at a joint parliamentary sitting for the duration of the legislature. Those members are not entitled to be part of any other committees or of the Government. The tasks of the Committee are to:

106. After the vote, the members of the Committee take an oath before both Chambers to respect the confidentiality of the documents and information received.
107. None of those provisions may prevent the Committee from publishing its conclusions, provided that it has obtained the authorisation of the permanent offices of the two Chambers of parliament to do so.
108. In the exercise of its functions, the Committee may call on the Romanian intelligence service to supply reports, items of information, written explanations, documents and various other data, and it may question the people concerned.
109. The Romanian intelligence service is obliged to provide the Committee in good time with the reports, information, explanations and documents that it requests and to allow the relevant people to be questioned. The following are exempt from that provision: ongoing intelligence-gathering activities, operational activities deemed by the Committee - on the recommendation of the Executive Bureau of the Governing Board of the Romanian intelligence service - to affect national security, and the practical methods and means used by the intelligence service as long as these do not contravene the Constitution or the applicable legislation.
110. The Committee presents an annual activity report to a joint sitting of the two Chambers. At the request of the permanent offices of the two Chambers it can also, if necessary, submit reports to them on the findings and conclusions arrived at in the exercise of its duties.
111. The Committee may invite to its meetings the Presidents of the permanent offices of the two Chambers; as well as the chairmen of the Committee for defence, public order and national security, and the members of the Supreme Council for national defence. It may also call on the services of the various experts in the different public bodies.
112. The work and actions of the Committee fall into the category of official secrets, except for the conclusions contained in the Committee reports, which may be published by the permanent offices of the two Chambers. The Committee members are obliged to respect rules concerning the complete confidentiality of official secrets contained in the documents and the data and intelligence to which they have access in the exercise of their duties. Any members violating those provisions can, under the rules of procedure of the two Chambers, find themselves deprived of their parliamentary immunity and subject to the sanctions laid down by the law.

113. The members of the Special Control Committee of Inquiry on the Activities of the SIS (Slovak Information Service) of the National Council of the Slovak Republic are elected by the National Council according to the principle of proportional representation (i.e. the number of members of parliamentary political groups). At present, there are 9 members of the Committee - 7 from the coalition and 2 from the opposition. Should a member leave his or her political group or should it cease to exist during the legislative period, that person will automatically lose his/her membership in the Committee.
114. Committee meetings are not public and are held at least once every quarter. The Director of the SIS submits a report on the activities of the SIS to the Committee at least once a year, as well as the data needed to scrutinise its budgetary expenditure and internal rules.
115. The Committee judges how the Statutes of the Slovak Information Service are adhered to and examines its draft budget and final management accounts. It keeps abreast of the ways in which matters are kept on file and of the cooperation agreements between the SIS and its partners from the other countries. It informs the National Council, the Slovak Government and the General Prosecutor of the Slovak Republic about any violations of the law.
116. The members of the Committee and other persons who are present - with the Committee's permission - at the meeting are bound to discretion under the Law on the Protection of the Confidential Facts.

117. The National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia has a special body - the Commission for Supervision of the Work of the Security and Intelligence Services - which is responsible for scrutinising the intelligence services.
118. The Commission for Supervision of the Work of the Security and Intelligence Services used to be set up by decree after each general election. However, following the adoption of new Rules of Procedure for the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia which came into force on 15 July 2002, the Commission for Supervision of the Work of the Security and Intelligence Services has become a Standing Committee of the National Assembly whose existence is mandatory.
119. Its activities are defined by Article 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, which stipulates that:

4. The situation in the WEU observer countries

120. Parliamentary oversight of the intelligence services is covered by Article 52(a) of the Federal Constitution. This is the result of an amendment that was adopted in 1991 following some work done by two committees of inquiry on two cases involving the intelligence services. That article stipulates that the relevant Committees of the Nationalrat (lower chamber) each have a specialised subcommittee to monitor the civil and military intelligence services. Those subcommittees set up under the defence and home affairs committees are composed of 14 members each and must include at least one representative of each political group. The members take an oath of secrecy before the President of the Nationalrat.
121. The task of the subcommittees as defined by Article 52(a) of the Federal Constitution is to verify the nature and legality of the measures taken by the intelligence services. Any member is entitled under the rules of parliamentary procedure to ask for information concerning those services, but any request to consult documents requires a decision by the subcommittee as a whole. The responsible minister may refuse such a request on the grounds of impossibility or of protecting the national interests or the safety of certain individuals. The two subcommittees have no budgetary powers in respect of the intelligence services budget.

122. The Folketing (Danish Parliament) had on several occasions prior to 1988 discussed the possibility of strengthening scrutiny over the activities of the intelligence services by establishing a special committee or by other means.
123. In 1988, the Government submitted a proposal for a law on the establishment of a committee on the defence and police intelligence services. The proposal involved creating a special committee with responsibility for scrutinising intelligence activities, composed of 5 members of the Folketing appointed by the parties with a seat on the Praesidium of the Folketing. It was adopted by parliament on June 28 1988.
124. With the Act on the establishment of a Committee on the police and intelligence services, it became possible for members of the largest political parties to supervise the activities of the intelligence services.
125. The Government keeps the Committee informed about the content of the guidelines it lays down for the activities of the services. Furthermore, it keeps the Committee abreast of major circumstances concerning security or foreign policy matters affecting the activities of the services. When the supervisory arrangements were drawn up, particular attention was paid to ensuring that the system for the submission of information by the Government and its processing by the Committee would take due account of the particular security instructions and warnings applying to intelligence activities. Thus, the members of the Committee are bound to secrecy about what they learn in the Committee.
126. The Committee does not exercise budgetary control over the intelligence services. However, it may be informed of general budgetary matters regarding those services.
127. As regards the powers of the Committee, Section 3 of the Act stipulates that the Committee can, either orally or in writing, notify the Government of its opinion on the matters discussed by the Committee.
128. The Committee's activities have been described in the three reports drafted by the Committee since the Act came into force. Since the Committee members are bound to secrecy, the reports do not contain any description of the specific matters discussed by the Committee. However, they do provide information about the frequency of meetings and the depth of the Committee's investigations.
129. Since its appointment, the Committee has held 43 meetings, 22 of which were attended by the Minister for Justice and the Minister of Defence, as well as by the department heads from the two ministries and the head of the Danish Defence and Police Intelligence Services. During that time it has put 141 questions to the two Ministers, 122 requiring written and 19 oral answers. The written answers were discussed at the meetings between the Committee and the Ministers.
130. Through those meetings and the replies to questions, the Committee has been informed of the content of the guidelines that apply to the activities of the intelligence services. Furthermore, the Committee has raised a few questions which, despite their specific character, have been of a more general interest.
131. Finally, the Government has kept the Committee informed of major security matters of importance for the activities of the intelligence services.

132. The scrutiny exercised by the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament) over the secret services takes various forms:

133. Continuous control and supervision of the activities of the armed forces are exercised by a special Board reporting to the Government: the Armed Forces Intelligence Board (FUN), whose members often have links with the Riksdag.
134. Since 2000, the intelligence operations of the armed forces have been regulated by a new law which establishes the framework for those operations and sets out the main tasks and methods of work.
135. The secret service was recently examined by a commission of public enquiry. In 1999 the Commission on the Secret Services produced its report entitled "The secret service: a review".

136. Although the systems described in this report are the result of each country's history, constitutional system and specific situation, making it difficult to advocate a particular model, there are nevertheless a number of general comments that can be made.
137. Firstly, it should be noted that the majority of parliaments have adopted laws on the existence of parliamentary bodies in charge of scrutinising the intelligence services, and that the texts creating or reorganising those services reveal an awareness on the part of parliamentarians of their task of guaranteeing democratic principles in a stable fashion, independently of individual legislatures or governments.
138. The aim of this type of oversight, for which there is provision in the law, is generally to ensure that the intelligence services are used properly for the purpose of national security and within the limits of the specified legislative framework, rather than to judge the way in which the services function and are managed, although in practice it is true that there is an interaction between those different elements.
139. It should also be noted that in order to reconcile the need for oversight with that for secrecy, the parliamentary bodies responsible for oversight are in all the cases analysed small in size, so that the work is done by a limited group of parliamentarians with a view to ensuring the highest degree of confidentiality. For the same reason, meetings are held in camera and the minutes, where they exist at all, are not published.
140. The composition of those bodies of course reflects the political spectrum in parliament, while another principle often adhered to is to have them chaired by a member of the opposition, in order to ensure that the supervisory body exercises genuine scrutiny of the government.
141. As far as the powers of such bodies are concerned, they generally play an active role, with the right to call directly on the authorities in charge of the intelligence services for documents and explanations. In those countries where the parliamentary body plays only a passive role confined to receiving regular reports from the government, reform proposals are under study. Hence there are currently countries where Parliament's role is confined to simple monitoring and others where it has stronger powers of scrutiny. Parliament may sometimes flex its muscles when the government is not prepared to release certain confidential documents and a majority vote in the supervisory body may serve to force the latter's hand. In all cases the ultimate aim is to place the government before its political responsibility vis-à-vis parliament by putting questions or drafting reports, which may in some cases express highly critical views.
142. It should also be noted that in practice the activities of such bodies in no way impinge on the powers of standing parliamentary committees or prevent the setting up of ad hoc committees of inquiry to investigate matters involving the intelligence services, so that parliaments are in no way divested of their prerogatives.
143. There are also similarities among these parliamentary bodies in terms of their practical work. Indeed, they are often bound by the law to submit annual reports which are disseminated and published. There is, however, no obligation to hold a parliamentary debate on such a report which remains an information document, unless a decision to the contrary is taken for political reasons.
144. Those bodies rarely have a say in budgetary matters, which remain the prerogative of the defence and home affairs committees that debate these issues as part of the general budget debate. Hence expenditure for the intelligence services tends to "get lost" in the overall budget discussion. This major shortcoming, present in most countries, seriously undermines the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny. There are some reform proposals involving an obligation to consult the supervisory bodies before budget matters go before the relevant parliamentary committees, and indeed such a principle could be integrated in existing systems without requiring major changes. To the extent that it entailed the members of the supervisory bodies being consulted or involved in the discussion without having the right to vote, such a reform would merely comprise a further logical step in the budget review process. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent the application of such a procedure on a voluntary basis, since parliamentarians can always participate as observers in other committees or even intervene in the discussion without having the right to vote. However, making it compulsory to consult the supervisory body would be conducive to a franker dialogue between governments and parliaments. The ideal solution would be for members of the supervisory bodies also to be members of the relevant parliamentary committees (defence or home affairs), but this is not possible in all countries.
145. Another shortcoming concerns the administrative and technical resources that are available to these supervisory bodies. Very often their secretariats are small, with limited access for reasons of confidentiality to appropriate working tools. In some countries there are plans to second an expert from the police services to the supervisory bodies, but here again this means that parliamentarians are being guided by civil servants. The parliamentary bodies therefore need to have more autonomous resources.
146. Those countries which have two-tier systems of oversight seem reasonably satisfied with the results. The first tier is composed of a committee of experts appointed by parliament to tackle the more technical issues and make choices in the field with regard to the increasingly sophisticated activities of the intelligence services. Indeed, one must not underestimate the difficulty of exercising parliamentary oversight in such a vast maze where information is easily concealed. The two-tier option is perhaps worthy of consideration by other parliaments, since it is not dependent on a specific constitutional system.

147. On the basis of this analysis, what contribution can the WEU Assembly make as regards the issue of parliamentary oversight over the intelligence services?
148. The information given to parliamentarians will provide a useful basis on which to consider the reforms that are under discussion in the national parliaments and might even encourage the introduction of similar proposals.
149. The aim of the resolution attached to this report is to draw attention to the existing structures in each country, which will need to be adapted to take into account the increasingly global nature of security issues, which makes it necessary to have cooperation and interaction at international level among the national intelligence services. How can national parliamentary scrutiny be made more effective, while at the same time ensuring that there is cooperation among partner countries, if their parliamentary structures are very different? How can the basis be created for the parliamentary cooperation that is necessary for effective oversight?
150. However, the resolution also aims to put forward a practical solution that is within everyone's reach. Indeed, the administrative autonomy of each assembly should make it possible, without too many adjustments being necessary, to allocate to the existing supervisory bodies the financial and human resources they need to improve their performance, whatever their form of organisation. Hence the importance of the political awareness demonstrated by the Assembly in its resolution.

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¹ Adopted unanimously and without amendment by the Assembly on 4 December 2002 (9^th sitting).

² Assembly Document A/1775, 4 June 2002;

http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2002/1775.html .